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Abstract
Background: In 2003, Mexico’s Seguro Popular de Salud (SPS), was launched as an innovative financial mechanism
implemented to channel new funds to provide health insurance to 50 million Mexicans and to reduce systemic
financial inequities. The objective of this article is to understand the complexity and dynamics that contributed to
the adaptation of the policy in the implementation stage, how these changes occurred, and why, from a complex
and adaptive systems perspective.
Methods: A complex adaptive systems (CAS) framework was used to carry out a secondary analysis of data obtained
from four SPS’s implementation evaluations. We first identified key actors, their roles, incentives and power, and their
responses to the policy and guidelines. We then developed a causal loop diagram to disentangle the feedback
dynamics associated with the modifications of the policy implementation which we then analyzed using a CAS
perspective.
Results: Implementation variations were identified in seven core design features during the first 10 years of
implementation period, and in each case, the SPS’s central coordination introduced modifications in response to
the reactions of the different actors. We identified several CAS phenomena associated with these changes including
phase transitions, network emergence, resistance to change, history dependence, and feedback loops.
Conclusions: Our findings generate valuable lessons to policy implementation processes, especially those involving a
monetary component, where the emergence of coping mechanisms and other CAS phenomena inevitably lead to
modifications of policies and their interpretation by those who implement them. These include the difficulty of
implementing strategies that aim to pool funds through solidarity among beneficiaries where the rich support
the poor when there are no incentives for the rich to do so. Also, how resistance to change and history dependence
can pose significant challenges to implementing changes, where the local actors use their significant power to oppose
or modify these changes.
Keywords: Complex adaptive systems, Universal health coverage, Stakeholder analysis, Causal loop diagram, Seguro
Popular, Mexico
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Background
Health systems are complex adaptive systems character-
ized by the constant interaction and feedback between
its constituting parts, leading to continuous changes and
adaptation and often unexpected consequences [1, 2].
Complex adaptive systems frameworks have been in-
creasingly used in recent years to understand the com-
plex nature of introducing new policies and how they
work and influence health systems [3–6], but applica-
tions of how this can be done in practice are still scarce,
especially in low- and middle-income countries [5, 7–
12]. This paper seeks to add to this body of knowledge
and understanding by applying a complex adaptive sys-
tems (CAS) framework to the question of how do health
systems actors respond to new policies, more specific-
ally, how do they react to, adapt or change the path of
policy implementation with respect to the way it was
conceived. We used the implementation of the financial
reform policy “Seguro Popular de Salud” (SPS) in Mexico
as a case study to explore this question.
In 2003, Mexico’s public health system experienced a
historical change in its financial structure. After decades
of chronic underfunding, the Health Social Protection
System (HSPS), and its financial component Seguro
Popular de Salud, was introduced to channel new funds
to provide a broad package of health services to around
50 million Mexicans who were not affiliated to any of
the traditional social security institution [13], founded to
provide health and other social services to formal indus-
trial workers. By 2012, SPS managed to generate an un-
precedented flow of financial resources equivalent to the
triple of resources that the Ministry of Health (SSA in
Spanish) accounted for in 2000 [14]. As a financial pol-
icy within the public system, SP defined its objectives to
(a) improve the distribution of public financial health re-
sources across the Mexican states, (b) reduce the inequi-
ties between those covered by social security schemes
and the rest of the population, and (c) reduce out-of-
pocket and catastrophic expenditure. The first two were
clearly accomplished over the rolling out period [15, 16],
but the third has only been partially accomplished. Lit-
erature shows that the effect of SPS has concentrated on
the reduction of catastrophic expenditure [17, 18].
In addition, SPS was also conceived to produce im-
provements in the performance of the public system
including increasing the number of the affiliated popula-
tion and the distribution of non-financial resources
(personnel, medicines, equipment) among the affiliated
populations throughout the country [19–22]. Empirical
evidence demonstrated improvement in patient satisfac-
tion due to drug availability, reduced waiting times and
better treatment for ambulatory and hospital care [13,
23, 24] and improved access to specific services such as
screening for breast cancer, diagnosis and treatment of
diabetes, and specific vaccines (e.g., measles) [13]. There
are also indications of reduced inequities in access to
health services, but the evidence is not yet conclusive.
Important reduction in the use of private hospital ser-
vices was also observed for new affiliated population
under SPS [25–27].
Although SPS has been demonstrated to produce vari-
ous relevant effects, not enough attention was given to
the implementation process and its implications on the
health systems and its overall goals. Therefore, while
SPS has achieved several hard-to-reach objectives, it is
still confronting enormous managerial challenges that
could be hindering its ability to ensure that its ultimate
goal is fulfilled—effective universal health coverage of all
Mexicans, through equitable access to affordable and
good quality health services with financial risk protec-
tion [13, 28]. After more than 10 years of its inception,
the policy implementation process has endured import-
ant variations across the 32 states [13], but we still do
not clearly understand the reasons behind these varia-
tions and how they may have affected SP capacity to ac-
complish systemic managerial goals.
Health systems as complex adaptive systems
Health systems share the same characteristics of CAS
[29]. Although CAS frameworks and methods have been
widely used to explore and understand complexity in
various disciplines such business, management, and edu-
cation, its application in health is relatively recent [12,
30, 31]. In the past decade, several studies concerned
with health systems interventions or strengthening indi-
cated the importance of using a different perspective
than the traditional linear approach that have been pre-
dominantly used in the health literature so far, but little
guidance is available as to how to apply it [30, 32, 33].
The relevance of understanding and analyzing health
systems problems using a CAS perspective stems from
the following fundamental characteristics of CAS that
also characterize health systems [2, 29, 34]. The interac-
tions among their components are non-linear and con-
stantly changing, their dynamics are unpredictable and
sometimes counter-intuitive, and they are capable to
self-organize, adapt, and learn from experience on a con-
stant basis [35–37]. Therefore, this inherent intercon-
nectedness and interdependence between health systems
components, its actors, and the context in which they
operate create a continuous process of feedback loops
with unpredictable time lags between the cause and ef-
fects, collectively creating a “dynamic complexity” [38].
As described by Paina and Peters (2011), CAS frame-
work provides a useful approach to analyze the behavior
generated by complex systems and its actors to under-
stand how the behavior was produced, what were the as-
sociated phenomena that occurred, and how they
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influenced the system and the implementation of pol-
icies [31]. Some of these CAS phenomena include net-
work emergence, where new hubs emerge that use their
collective power to influence the system in a way that is
greater than the sum of their individual powers; path de-
pendence, where states are not only influenced by the
policy itself but also by the initial conditions in each of
these states and decisions taken along the way; phase
transitions where threshold effects occur creating a new
status in the system “whether around the rapid adoption
of a policy stalled for years, changes in social norms con-
cerning health behaviors, or a new demand for health
services”, and feedback loops where an input to the sys-
tem generate a reaction or an outcome that feedbacks
into the system as an input to generate new processes or
effects [31].
All these phenomena are very relevant to our re-
search question. Understanding how Seguro Popular de
Salud’s policy implementation follows or differs from
its operational guidelines will not only clarify how and
why SPS’s implementation took the routes it chose dur-
ing these 10 years but also illuminate the thinking and
design of future policies. What causes these changes?
Why implementation guidelines are so difficult to im-
plement as conceived? All these questions require an
analytical approach that embraces complexity and the
adaptive nature of complex systems such as the health
system.
The objective of this study is, therefore, to apply a
complex adaptive systems perspective to understand (1)
the role of key actors and the way their responses and
power shaped the policy through its implementation; (2)
how the system adapted and modified the implementa-
tion of the policy and; (3) the dynamics by which this
happened. The answers to these questions offer a critical
insight to potential revisions or redesign of the policy
and/or development of an alternative one.
Methods
We used a case study approach to analyze the imple-
mentation of a financing reform policy, the Seguro
Popular de Salud in Mexico from a CAS perspective
This approach was selected for the following reasons:
(1) the case study permits to analyze in depth a con-
temporary phenomenon in its real context, especially
when the limits between the phenomenon and its
context are not evident; (2) it focuses on responding
the “hows” and the “whys” of a scarcely studied
phenomenon; (3) relevant lessons could be obtained
from a complex situation, based on the overall under-
standing of such situation, and (4) the results of the
study can contribute to yield proposals for the defin-
ition or redefinition of public policies and give way to
new research proposals [39, 40].
Data sources
A combination of secondary data sources were used to
inform our analysis, the majority of which were from
four consecutive evaluations of Seguro Popular de
Salud’s implementation processes carried out between
2007 and 2012 and published elsewhere [19, 39–43].
The four evaluations interviewed a total of 515 decision-
makers at the federal and states levels, 1031 doctors and
nurses from primary care units, and 2485 beneficiaries,
using structured and semi-structured interviews. These
reports also contain data on the number of enrolled
beneficiaries, management of financial resources, and
the structural and legal status of the financial intermedi-
ary unit in the different states as well as key informant
interviews with managerial and technical staff at national
and state level around various implementation processes
and associated challenges [22–24]. Three of the authors
(GN, LMGR, and CJ) participated from the start in the
planning and conduction of the four evaluations as well
as in the field data collection. However, in each evalu-
ation a team of 15 researchers were involved along the
process. The evaluations were financed by the Federal
Secretariat of Health and were carried out by the Na-
tional Institute of Public Health of Mexico (NIPH).
Other sources of information include financial flows
obtained from the National Commission; the SP concep-
tual, financial, and operational guidelines; and laws,
guidelines, and other normative documents that support
the SP operations including the 2007–2012 SP “White
Book” [44].
Applying a complex adaptive systems framework
Peters DH (2014) provided a comprehensive review of
the relevant methods to address problems of complexity
within health systems [12]. The methodological paper by
Paina and Peters (2011) provide a detailed framework
for how to explore and analyze complex interventions as
they are scaled up using a complex adaptive systems per-
spective [31]. They provide descriptions of the different
phenomena that may occur when systems change as a
reaction to intervening as described above, with exam-
ples of how they can be explored and tested, which we
applied in this study. More specifically, data from the
four SPS evaluations were reanalysed to explicitly ex-
plore what changes occurred in the policy over the first
decade if its implementation, how the change was trig-
gered, by whom action was taken, and how this affected
the policy and its intended goals. Whenever a CAS phe-
nomena or an action (by the system or its actor) was de-
tected, additional secondary data sources were sought to
further explore or confirm the observation. This iterative
process was visually depicted using a causal loop dia-
gram as explained below to specifically look at relation-
ships between triggers, actions, and change in the form
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of feedback loops. Causal loops are very good means to
go through such process as was successfully used by
Rwashana et al. 2014 [4], Varghese et al. 2014 [11], and
Paina et al. 2014 [5].
Analysis of data
First, a detailed analysis of the main actors, their incen-
tives, role, power, and responses to the implementation
of the policy, including the way each of them adapted or
interpreted the policy at its different phases of develop-
ment, was performed. Then, the various changes and ad-
aptations in the policy’s implementation and the reasons
and dynamics involved in these adaptations were ex-
tracted from the various data sources taking into ac-
count different variations to policy adaptations in
various states or by various actors. Next, the study team,
which constitutes multi-disciplinary Mexican and inter-
national researchers, used this information to interpret
the changes in the implementation of the policy and the
mechanisms by which they happened. This iterative
process was guided by the development of a causal loop
diagram depicting the original and modified operational
framework and the feedback loops that evoked those
changes. This stage of the analysis was instrumental
for the next and final stage, which employed a CAS
framework to explore the mechanisms by which the
changes occurred and the associated CAS phenomena
(see below).
Causal loop diagram
The generated list of changes in the implementation of
SPS and its link to the various actors (see Table 1) were
used to develop a causal loop diagram to understand
how the implementation of policy was carried out over
time and what were the dynamics involved in this
process. Causal loop diagrams provide a useful approach
to illustrate complex systems characteristics such as dy-
namic relationships, non-linearity (e.g., in the form of
delays in outcomes after an initial intervention or ac-
tion), and feedback loops. They offer a means to under-
stand, interpret, and discuss dynamic relationships using
a common terminology and techniques [45]. Variables
are usually labeled in neutral terms using positive and
negative signs on the arrows that link variables to show
the direction of influence of one variable on another.
Feedback loops occur when arrows connect a variable to
itself through one or a series of variables.
There are two types of feedback loops. Balancing
loops, also called neutralizing loops, can be seen when a
resulting outcome was intending to neutralize an action
or a policy to bring the system back to the desired state.
Reinforcing loops depict a vicious circle that occurs
when an action creates an exponential outcome that
keeps increasing overtime, being reinforced by the
variable that caused it, until a break in the cycle hap-
pens. Reinforcing loops can be positive (desired) or
negative (undesired). A reinforcing loop has the same
signs in all the variables involved in this loop while a
balancing loop have opposite signs, since the intention is
to reduce the effect of a certain variable to bring the sys-
tem back to another (or the initial) desired state. A delay
in the outcome is denoted by .
Ethical considerations
Ethical approval for the four evaluations was obtained
from the National Institute of Public Health’s Ethics and
Research Commission. Key informants were told prior to
the interviews about the objectives of the interview and
the evaluation. Consent letters were signed by all those
who accepted to be interviewed. All information provided
by informants was safely stored in a computer where only
the general coordinator of the evaluation had access to.
Results
In this section, we first describe the range of the main
actors that were involved in the implementation of the
policy, the characteristics of their interactions, and how
they coped and adapted in reaction to the policy
(Table 1). We then focus on how their responses led to
modifications of the policy implementation over time
followed by a description of the CAS phenomena that
emerged from the analysis (Fig. 1).
The range of actors and their responses to the policy
Table 1 describes the range of main actors involved in
the operation of SPS by 2012, their incentives, role,
power, and response to the policy implementation. The
new role of main actors and how they emerged are de-
scribed in turn below.
All actors identified are public and private actors that
normally interact in the managerial processes that are
carried out at federal and state levels. However, within
SPS’s original design, some were not included, others
were included and maintained their original role while a
third group were included but modified their role.
The state’s treasuries were not explicitly mentioned in
the original regulatory framework but they were the re-
cipients of federal funds coming from the National
Commission in order to register them to be subjected to
federal audits. The assumption was that it would guaran-
tee the transparent use of funds and facilitate account-
ability. In practice, the transfer of funds from treasuries
to REPSS was seriously delayed (taking weeks and even
months to be completed) which resulted in a new regu-
latory requirement for compulsory reports about delays
[46]. Other federal health subsidies were by the State
Secretariat of Health in a single pot to facilitate the
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Table 1 Main actors, original and modified roles, and influence in the allocation and management of Seguro Popular financial resources
Actor Objective/iIncentives Role in the system Power Policy responses Source
National Commission of the Health
Social Protection Policy (considered
in the guidelines and had the same
role as originally intended)
Ensure that the policy achieves its
desired goals
To manage financial resources and
transfer them to the states
Coordinate the operation
Stewardship
To evaluate the REPSS performance
as well as the overall system.
To support the accountability of
funds
High but without legal capacity
of sanctioning
It can delay disbursement of
funds, e.g., if financial reports are
not received
It cannot act if they detect
mishandling of resources
-Adapted and modified the policy
-Changed the definition of capitation
from family to individual
-Accepted the state’s 15 % financial
share to be represented by previous
investments
-Introduced a cap on spending on
medicines (30 %) and hiring (40 %)
-Families belonging to III and IV
deciles were exempted from pre-
payment
[24, 42]
State government treasury (not
explicitly mentioned in the original
guidelines but having a role)
Provide a mechanism for auditing
the flow of funds
Receive funds from the National
Commission and register them in
the state’s financial system
High because of legal capacity to
handle finances and sanctioning
-Kept funds as much as they can to
obtain bank interests
[22, 23]
State Ministry of Health (considered
in the guidelines but its role changed)
Provide health services through
its public network
Receive funds and allocate according
to capitation
High, e.g., in terms of fund
allocation according to their
priorities and network since it
substituted the original role of
REPSS
-Kept REPSS inside its structure to
keep hold of federal financial
resources
-Did not implement capitation but
maintained historical budget due to
lack of information and managerial
capacity
-Initially issued short staff contracts
to reduce costs but under pressure
had to extend contracts




State Health Social Protection
Regime (REPSS) (considered in the
guidelines but changed its role)
Original: Purchasing of services
from public and private in an
equitable and efficient way
Revised (except in one state):
ensure the highest number of
affiliates registered and reported




Management of financial resources
Purchasing of services,
Accountable to state and federal
authorities
Revised (except in one state):
Administering the funds from
affiliating new people into the plan.
Transfer this information to the
National Commission
To participate in the allocation of
resources to public health units
Low power or influence in
allocation of funds
Their role shrunk over time by
being absorbed by the state
MOH
Although they existed under the
MOH, they became increasingly
passive
-Increased number of affiliated
families, e.g., by re-interpreting the
guidelines to identify single member
families, to increase the funds
allocated to the state
[43, 44]
National Workers Union (not
considered in the guidelines but
acquired an active role)
Represent the interests of
unionized workers towards the
employer
Negotiate the regularization of
contracts.
Monitor the process of regularization
High: Every regularized worker
pays a 2 % fee of the value of the
contract to receive protection
from the union (contracts
consumes between 40–60 % of
the system’s total SP funds)
-Became active in the regularization
of contracts process by negotiating














Table 1 Main actors, original and modified roles, and influence in the allocation and management of Seguro Popular financial resources (Continued)
Contracted workers
(not considered in the guidelines but
having active role)
Obtain contracts to provide
services
Participate in the delivery of services
to the SP affiliated population
Low: they did not put pressure to
obtain better contracts
Became active in the regularization
of contracts process by accepting




considered in the guidelines but
having an active role)
Participate in bids and sell their
products
Negotiate the selling price of
medicines with each state
High: there are limited number of
retailers and they lobby to agree
on medicine pricing levels
-Depending on the state, retailers
negotiated highly profitable contracts
-Used their corporative and
marketizing capacity to sell their
products and to agree on drug
prices used in bids
[23, 45]
Pharmaceutical distributors (NEW)
(not considered in the guidelines but
acquired an active role)
Win the bid for distributing drugs
within the state
Negotiate to win the bid Low—as there is more competition -Used different marketing strategies
to win distribution bids and to
convince the states that they could
reduce allocation times despite the
cost involved.
[23]
State health bureaucracy (considered
in the guidelines and had an active
role)
As possible:
-Use funds to cover its needs
-Continue to function as before
Management of Seguro Popular
funds at different levels and activities
High—in terms of flexibility to
manage and spend funds
As initially no sanction system
existed (before auditing started in
2009), some:
1. Bought medicines at high prices
2. Bought non-authorized goods
3. Contracted health workers without
demonstrated competence
[23, 24]
Health units (providers) (considered
in the guidelines but had a passive
role)
Provide health services according
to population needs and their
capacity
Receive resources and provide
services to the affiliated population
No power as they do not receive
any funds directly
-No incentive to change status
quo—business as usual
-Complained about not being heard
or participate actively in the
allocation process or decision—e.g.,




Beneficiaries affiliated to Seguro
Popular (considered in the guidelines
and acquired an active role)
Original:
Had the right to choose providers
Current:
In practice, cannot exert that right
as they have to deal with limited
number of providers (mostly
public sector)
Recipients of health services contained
in the package of benefits
Low but increasing—e.g., if they
organize themselves to exert
more pressure
-As they received information about
their rights, they increasingly
became more vocal in obtaining














distribution across the different programs that in some
states created a great administrative confusion. REPSS in
most states was located within the SSA’s structure and
became subjected to the SSA decisions on how to pool
and when to distribute the funds.
The participation of national workers union was not
considered in the original design. It formally represents
the interests of the SSA permanent workers but not of
temporary employees. The union became agile to par-
ticipate in negotiations to provide better labor condi-
tions for the new short-term non-permanent employees
that escalated after the introduction of SP [42, 47]. The
negotiations resulted in setting a minimum period for
short-term contracts of 12 months, with benefits in-
cluded, and it provided the union with a 2 % salary con-
tribution for each new contract as a union fee [42, 47].
These new conditions are known as the “regularization
of contracts.”
The other important actor showing an emerging role
is the pharmaceutical wholesale retailers. These enter-
prises, enjoying a limited market competition, also put
pressure on the states SSA middle-range managers to in-
fluence purchasing decisions. Although the medicines
purchasing process is carried out through public bidding,
enterprises initially managed to negotiate excessively high
prices in some states or provided cheaper alternatives to
the products included in their bids after the signing of the
contracts [28]. A number of pharmaceutical distributors
identified a market niche in the transportation of medi-
cines from SSA central premises to health care units, par-
ticularly those located in remote areas.
Finally, an actor that is diffused into the institutional
structure is the SSA middle-range bureaucracy, which
involves the various administrative levels all the way
from the state secretariat to the front-line health
providers. Being responsible for various expenditure deci-
sions across the implementation process, several heteroge-
neous behavior and un-authorized expenses were reported
such as purchasing of non-authorized vehicles and equip-
ment, accepting bids for medicines well beyond the uni-
tary prices defined by the federal government authorities,
and contracting health workers that do not fulfil the mini-
mum required skills or qualifications that receive salaries
well above the norms [43]. While these practices have
been detected by the federal audit system, the original SPS
design did not foresee a penalty or sanction system that
can allow the National Commission, responsible for track-
ing the use of funds, to address these practices in a legal
way so while they could point it out to the respective ad-
ministration, they had no power to enforce a change.
Adaptations in the course of the policy implementation
Figure 2 is a causal loop diagram that illustrates seven
modifications or adaptations of the policy implementa-
tion (highlighted in circles) and the associated balancing
and reinforcing feedback loops that evoked the changes.
The figure should be read from the center outwards. In
the center of the figure is the National Commission. The
rectangles show the five main components of the policy
identified and how each of them has been modified during
the course of the implementation resulting in seven modi-
fications (including six feedback loops) representing either
the system’s or the actors’ response to the original design
and how they coped with it or adapted it. Feedback loops
were generated during the 10 years of implementation
contributing to its modifications and adjustments, each
one of them of a different nature. We discuss the seven
modifications and the associated feedback loops in turn
below, referring to the circles in Fig. 2 starting in a clock-
wise manner from the bottom.
Fig. 1 Initial design of Seguro Popular policy
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Establishment of the State Secretariat of Health as de
facto financial intermediary, rather than REPSS. Given
that most REPSS were housed in the state’s SSA, the lat-
ter influenced all REPSS decisions and became the de
facto financial allocator therefore halting the original
intention to separate purchasing from provision of ser-
vices [41, 42]. Not surprisingly, preference was given to
allocate funds in public units and purchasing services
from private providers was limited. In addition, historical
budgeting rather than per capita budgeting remained the
main criteria for allocation of funds to health units. This
was attributed to a lack of managerial capacity within
the state to switch to per capita budgeting and planning,
limited information, and perceived complexity of setting
up a whole new system to identify where population re-
sided and what services are they effectively demanding
and consuming.
From family allocation to per capita allocation of
funds. In the original design, the capitation estimate was
based on an average family size of 3.8 members. Funds
started flowing based on these criteria in the initial
years, but by 2007, the National Commission noted that
the number of one-person families had grown unexpect-
edly in several states. According to the original guide-
lines, it was possible for above 18 individuals to be
considered a new family unit even if they still reside with
their parents which created an incentive to do so to in-
crease the funds allocated to the various states. In re-
sponse, the National Commission revised the operational
guidelines in 2009 to base the per capita allocation of
funds per capita and not per family unit. This revision
benefited the Southern states, where poor families tend to
be bigger in size [43].
Changes in what the states’ financial contribution to
SP’s fund is interpreted. Each state was expected to pro-
vide proof of the availability of their state contribution
up-front before receiving the remaining portion from
the federal level. Several states struggled to demonstrate
ear-marking these funds upfront, arguing that they were
part of their ongoing investments to support the various
health services for their population and therefore his-
toric investments that have been incurred should be
considered as part of their contribution. This dispute
threatened the flow of funds to the states, which would
hamper the impact of the policy as a whole. With more
states supporting the arguments, the National Commis-
sion decided to develop new guidelines in 2009 that for-
malized this practice, therefore, guaranteeing the flow of
federal resources through the system [43].
Changes in pre-payment regulations. The fourth source
of funds for Seguro Popular de Salud is the pre-payment
made by households belonging to the third income de-
cile or higher. However, it became extremely difficult to
collect pre-payment fees from households. Over the ex-
istence of SP around 92–95 % of the enrolled families
did not pay fees [48]. After refining the instrument for
identification of socio-economic status for the rest of in-
come deciles and failing to increase fee collection, the
National Commission opted to exempt the third and
fourth income deciles from paying the fee, which was
also formalized in 2009. The objectives of this change














































































































Fig. 2 Causal loop diagrams illustrating the feedback loops and modifications of the policy
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enrolment in order to attain the 100 % affiliation goal by
2012, the last year of the federal administration, and to
reduce the costs of collecting the fee from those groups
of populations that presented more difficulties to do so.
Introducing a ceiling for expenditures on human re-
sources. Contracting of new health workers was the
major source of expenditure in SP. In the early years,
the National Commission noted that some states spent
up to 70 % of the funds in contracting. In response, they
negotiated a ceiling with the states for a maximum of
40 % of the total funds to be spent on this budget line.
However, by 2010, after the change in contracting mo-
dality, 23 states were surpassing the 40 % ceiling which
explains why this component still represents a major
challenge [28, 41, 43].
Introducing a ceiling for expenditures on medicines.
The second biggest source of expenditures has been pur-
chasing and procurement of medicines. Similar to con-
tracting, the National Commission negotiated with the
states on establishing a ceiling of 30 % of total funds for
the purchasing of medicines [28, 41, 43].
Establishment of a new Coordinating Commission for
the Negotiation of Prices of Medicines and other Inputs.
While medicines’ expenditures seemed to be contained
within the 30 % ceiling, various coping strategies have
emerged from pharmaceutical retailers in response to
the cap. For example, by negotiating different unit prices
for some medicines in different states and/or providing
cheaper alternatives after the bid was accepted [18]. The
National Commission, having noted this increasingly
heterogeneous and irregular use of funds, convened key
federal stakeholders and regulators together to establish
new guidelines for the purchasing of medicines at national
level. This involved the creation of a new Coordinating
Commission for Negotiating the Price of Medicines and
other Health Inputs that was responsible to negotiate, as a
single public entity, unitary prices of medicines with indi-
vidual drug manufacturers [49].
Complex adaptive systems phenomena emerging from
this analysis
In this section, we describe the various complex adaptive
systems (CAS) phenomena that we identified through
our analysis. They include phase transitions, unexpected
consequences, resistance to change, history dependence,
coping mechanisms, emergence of networks, delays and
non-linear outcomes, and feedback loops.
Regarding phase transitions, the design of Seguro
Popular represented a major transformation in the oper-
ational rationale of Mexico’s public health sub-system in-
cluding innovations in financing, allocation of resources,
definition of explicit packages of services, management
procedures, and role and rights of users as newly “insured”
populations. However, our analysis shows that the
transition is partial and has mainly occurred in some of
the components, particularly the financial component of
the original design, expecting changes in other compo-
nents to happen in further stages.
There are several examples of unexpected conse-
quences that emerged from our analysis. One of them is
the rise of the number of affiliated families, which was
the basis for fund allocation to the states, due to the un-
expected increase of one-person families. This example
offers an interesting observation of how policies may be
interpreted by its implementers when the details are not
clearly defined or provide room for various interpreta-
tions. As the guidelines opened the possibility for the
states to consider individuals above 18, who are not stu-
dents, to be regarded a new family unit, probably assum-
ing they may be in the workforce, several states
interpreted this as a blank provision and therefore inflated
the number of one-person families to increase the re-
source flows allocated to them.
Resistance to change typically appear in reaction to
new policies and our analysis of Seguro Popular de Salud
provides some examples. The first is the resistance of
the state’s SSA to guarantee their share of resources to
SPS as liquid funds before federal funds are disbursed.
Another example is how households found ways to avoid
paying the pre-payment conditional on income level. A
third example is the strong preference of local health
managers to maintain historical budgeting as the basis
for allocating funds, rather than per capita based on new
affiliates. This same example is also an illustration of
history dependence where the past dictates the future
and changing the ways of working and spending is not
always easy or fast to implement.
Delays and non-linearity were reflected in the way
various outcomes, and changes were observed in the
various states. For example, the speed by which states
started inflating the number of families and their strat-
egies to negotiate the allocation of their 16.6 % co-
responsibility as liquid funds up-front before the
remaining of the fund is disbursed to them. The main
non-linearity example is that the availability of resources
(e.g., medicines, workers) and the capacity to produce
services, particularly at the first level of care, does not
correspond with the investment that Seguro Popular de
Salud has made into the system. As to coping mecha-
nisms, a good example is the alternatives pharmaceutical
retailers’ sought in response to the imposed cap on ex-
penditures on medicines as explained above.
Feedback loops occurred in various ways as described
above and illustrated in the CLD in Fig. 2. Finally, vari-
ous examples of emergence of networks and their col-
lective impact were identified. For example, in the way
how pharmaceutical distributors emerged and coalesced
to develop a structured way of interacting with the
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implementers of the policy; how service providers collect-
ively formed strong negotiation mechanisms to ensure
that the status quo of historical funding prevails [23, 24];
and how the states gradually managed to exert pressure
on the National Commission leading to their reformula-
tion of the state’s contribution and what it entails.
Discussion
One of the main strengths of this study is that it sought
to apply a complexity lens through a CAS framework to
understand the complex nature of implementing Seguro
Popular de Salud in Mexico. While previous studies fo-
cused on top level parameters and indicators such as the
increased volume and flow of funds to the health sector
[13, 17, 18, 50], this study’s main interest is how did this
happen and what modifications and coping mechanisms
were involved, from the perspective of complex and
adaptive systems. A limitation, however, is that it heavily
relies on secondary data sources corresponding to a spe-
cific period of time (2007–2012). Thus, the current situ-
ation of SPS implementation could have changed from
the one that was originally described.
The lessons of this analysis are applicable to any other
settings aiming to incorporate a flow of fresh funds to
improve the system’s performance and capacity. Our
study emphasizes that no matter how evidence-based or
logical the aim and design of a policy is, its implementa-
tion will undoubtedly follow different paths that are
mostly unpredictable and unanticipated [51, 52]. Stra-
tegic governance of the systems and continuous evalu-
ation and refining of policies are, therefore, essential for
the execution of policies as it requires adequate know-
ledge of the complex behavior of health systems and
substantial capacity of negotiation and leadership to be
able to detect and adjust to the change in behavior of
the system and its actors striving for maintaining the de-
sired outcomes and goals and mitigating undesired con-
sequences [53].
For example, resistance to change was also shown in
other contexts has been associated with the implementa-
tion of new policies including financial reforms. In
Tanzania, a financial reform that was aimed at expand-
ing the health insurance coverage to the whole popula-
tion failed to expand beyond 10 % of the population
after 10 years of its implementation due to resistance
from district level implementers who felt not involved in
the design of the policy and that it was imposed on them
from the central level [54]. History dependence in our
case illustrated by the strong push by the local health
managers to maintain historical budget level as the basis
for allocating funds was also observed in other settings,
e.g., in the Chinese reform,, emphasizing that changing
the ways of working and spending is not always easy or
fast to implement [55].
Two specific lessons for future financial reforms also
emerged from our study. First, while Mexico attempted
to avoid the risk of channelling the new financial flows
through the private sector as in the case of Colombia in
its 1990s reform, which created an enormous concentra-
tion of financial resources and corruption practices in
these units [56], maintaining these new financial flows in
the public sector exposed them to the power and incen-
tives of the state governments which also have has a dif-
ferent set of risks and challenges as described in this
paper. A second lesson is the difficulty of implementing
a solidarity approach where the rich support the poor in
collecting fees insurance premiums. In SPS, beneficiar-
ies, including the rich, systematically avoided paying
these fees, presumably because they did not see the ben-
efits to them of doing so. The same experience was en-
countered in the Chinese reform [57].
In summary, applying a CAS framework to this ana-
lysis expanded our capacity to describe and understand
this complex policy in a much more insightful and real-
istic ways, providing much richer and meaningful inter-
pretation of the effects of the policy and a better
understanding of how and why it was adapted in the
course of its implementation. Policies that involve a
monetary component share similar “risks” for perverse
behaviors and this study carry lessons for relevant pol-
icies in other settings.
Conclusions
Applying a systems thinking approach to future policy
design, implementation, and evaluation, recognizing the
characteristics of complex adaptive systems and embra-
cing approaches that are consistent with this complexity
would offer valuable steps forwards in the way policies
are conceptualized, designed, and implemented. This
process would involve the wider range of key stake-
holders in the policy design stage, analyzing the incen-
tives, roles and power of the key actors, including those
that may emerge during the implementation of the pol-
icy, considering middle-range and front-line implemen-
ters as well as the beneficiaries, and brainstorming on
the possible unexpected consequences with these various
key actors to try and mitigate some of them [29].
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